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Abstract: Advancements in medical device design over the last number of years have allowed medical device 
manufacturers to add more complex functionality particularly through the use of software. Such 
advancements include the ability for devices to communicate wirelessly across networks, from device to 
device and over the Internet.  However, with such advancements comes additional risks; these are security 
risks, vulnerabilities and threats.  In the past twelve months, concern within the medical device community 
has led to the US Government calling upon the FDA to take responsibility of medical device security.  In 
support of this, this position paper details a research proposal to address medical device security issues 
through the development of a Process Reference Model (PRM) and a Process Assessment Model (PAM) to 
assess the capability of the processes used to develop medical devices intended to be incorporated onto 
healthcare networks and also determine the product security capability through the development of security 
assurance cases created following the lifecycle process.  Further, in support of IEC 80001-2-2, the output 
from this PRM will be an assurance case with a security assurance level, which will be used to communicate 
the security capabilities of the product between Medical Device Manufacturers (MDMs) and Healthcare 
Delivery Organisations (HDOs).  The intent is to build a better awareness of vulnerability types, threats and 
related risks to assist in reducing the likelihood of harm resulting from a security risk. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Medical devices have made substantial innovative 
design improvements over the last number of years 
due to the growing incorporation of software in the 
devices. Following on from the addition of software 
came the introduction of interoperable medical 
devices bringing with it, a new set of security risks 
for consideration. Although there have been no 
reports of malicious attacks on interoperable medical 
devices, there have been quite a number of 
controlled hacking demonstrations. One such 
demonstration was at the Black Hat Security 
Conference in Las Vegas in 2011. A security 
researcher, Jeremy Radcliffe, manipulated the 
settings of his own insulin pump during a 
presentation. The ease with which the insulin pump 
was hacked created a lot of concern within the 
medical device community. Then in October 2012, 
Barnaby Jack, a researcher at IOActive, presented 
research results at the Breakpoint Conference in 
Australia, which looked at the security of 
pacemakers. Jack’s research identified a bug in 
several manufacturers’ pacemakers that allowed an 
attacker to deliver a potentially lethal shock to a 
patient’s heart by sending a signal to the pacemaker 
by simply using a laptop. The pacemaker contained 
a coding error that allowed it to send a wireless 
command to the device that returned the model and 
serial number of the device. 
Consequently, in a letter to the US Office of 
Management and Budget, the Information Security 
and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) called upon 
the government to assign the responsibility of 
medical device security to a federal entity such as 
FDA. In August 2012, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) released a report of an 
audit carried out on the FDA for the assessment of 
two implantable medical devices that highlighted 
shortfalls in the assessment of intentional and 
unintentional risk (Government Accountability 
Office, 2012). 
In addition to this quite a number of medical 
device security information and guidance documents 
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 have been recently released. One example, the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a 
bulletin “Attack Surface: Healthcare and Public 
Health Sector”(DHS, 2012) which discusses security 
related risks associated with using medical devices 
on IT networks, including those risks to patient 
safety and theft or loss of medical information. 
Addressing this recent concern, the aim of this 
research is to build security assurance into the 
product lifecycle through a set of strategic processes, 
activities and tasks and to establish and 
communicate the product security capabilities of a 
medical device between Medical Device 
Manufacturers, vendors and Healthcare Delivery 
Organisations. This will create awareness for both, 
the Medical Device Manufacturers in understanding 
the needs of the Healthcare Delivery Organisation, 
and also for Healthcare Delivery Organisation IT 
admin staff, to understand the capabilities of the 
medical device that could potentially be acquired for 
use on their IT network. 
Section two of this paper outlines the most 
relevant standards and documents currently used 
within the software industry in relation to process 
assessment, software lifecycle assurance and 
security.  Section three looks at related work in the 
area of process assessment models and security. 
Section four then discusses the future work planned 
for this research, including the validation of the 
model and also the impact this research is expected 
to have in the medical device domain for regulators, 
Medical Device Manufacturers, IT vendors and 
Healthcare Delivery Organisations. 
2 CURRENT LANDSCAPE WITH 
STANDARDS 
With the substantial transformation in medical 
device design over the last few years to incorporate 
software and communication functionality, the 
medical device communities around the world have 
published many standards and guidance documents 
to assist with the development of safe medical 
devices. This has resulted in an abundance of 
published security guidance documents and a sense 
of confusion among Medical Device Manufacturers 
and Healthcare Delivery Organisations with regards 
which guidelines and best practices to follow. 
This section outlines the most applicable 
standards and guidance documents which are 
deemed most relevant in establishing and controlling 
security risks.  A broad range of standards have been 
reviewed for this research, with the most 
fundamental being discussed here. Additional 
standards identified and incorporated into this 
research to date are discussed in Section three. 
2.1 ISO/IEC 15026-4 
ISO/IEC 15026-4 (IEEE, 2011) provides 
recommendations and guidelines for implementing 
software and systems development processes that 
require additional assurance for a particular property 
of that system or software; in this case the critical 
property is security.  This standard presents a list of 
recommended processes, activities and tasks 
required in order to achieve a claim in relation to 
that critical property of a system or software.  
Through the development of an assurance case 
(further discussed in section 2.2), the entire 
development and maintenance of the product is 
addressed which also includes project-planning 
considerations. It is intended that this standard be 
used coupled with an already defined life cycle 
model. 
2.2 ISO/IEC 15026-2 
ISO/IEC 15026-2 (IEEE, 2011) defines 
requirements for the structure and content of an 
assurance case. An assurance case is a body of 
evidence organised into an argument demonstrating 
some claim that a system holds i.e. ‘Is Assured’.  An 
assurance case is needed when it is important to 
show that a system exhibits some complex property 
such as safety, security, or reliability (Goodenough 
et al., 2012). 
A security assurance case is often compared with 
a legal case where there are two elements to the 
case, the argument and the evidence to support a 
claim.  For an assurance case to be effective it must 
satisfy the following points: 
 Must make a claim or set of claims about a 
property of a system; 
 Provide a set of arguments; 
 Make clear the assumptions and judgements 
underlying the arguments; 
 Associate different viewpoints and levels of detail. 
 Produce the supportive evidence; 
2.3 IEC 80001-2-2 
IEC 80001-2-2 (IEC, 2011c) is a technical report 
which provides a framework for the communication 
and disclosure of medical device needs, risks and 




 network. This technical report presents 20 security 
capabilities (Table 1) e.g. Authorization, Audit 
Controls etc. These capabilities provide Healthcare 
Delivery Organisations, Medical Device 
Manufacturers and IT vendors with information 
regarding user needs, security related requirements 
and required security control types. 
This information is critical prior to development, 
acquisition, installation and use of medical devices 
for IT networks. Each of these security capabilities 
represents a potential security risk control.  These 
are addressed in the requirement goals, which 
identify the risks that can be mitigated against 
through the use of that particular security capability. 
The user need section develops this further by 
detailing particular specific environmental 
requirements. 
Table 1: IEC 80001-2-2 Security Capabilities. 
 Security Capability Code 
1 Automatic Logoff ALOF 
2 Audit Controls AUDT 
3 Authorization AUTH 
4 Configuration of Security Features CNFS 
5 Cyber Security Product Upgrades CSUP 
6 Data Backup and Disaster Recovery DTBK 
7 Emergency Access EMRG 
8 Health Data De-Identification DIDT 
9 Health Data Integrity and Authentication IGAU 
10 Health Data Storage Confidentiality STCF 
11 Malware Detection/Protection MLDP 
12 Node Authentication NAUT 
13 Person Authentication PAUT 
14 Physical Locks on Device PLOK 
15 Security Guides SGUD 
16 System and Application Hardening SAHD 
17 Third-Party Components in Product Lifecycle Roadmaps RDMP 
18 Transmission Confidentiality TXCF 
19 Transmission Integrity TXIG 
20 Unique User ID UUID 
The security disclosure is a summary statement 
provided by the Medical Device Manufacturer 
and/or IT vendor that details the security capability 
of the medical device. This security disclosure is 
then reviewed by the Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation to establish the security integrity of the 
product and prompt further discussion prior to 
acquisition. The risk management team within the 
Healthcare Delivery Organisation utilise this further 
to perform a risk analysis based on the known 
security capabilities. 
2.4 IEC 62443-3-3 
IEC 62443-3-3 (IEC, 2011a) defines security system 
requirements based on a combination of system 
functional requirements and a risk assessment. Key 
inputs into the development of this document are 
security standards ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO/IEC, 2005) 
and NIST SP800-53(NIST, 2009). The standard is 
adopted by allowing the asset owner for the system 
so dictate the target Security Assurance Level (SAL-
T). The standard details seven Foundational 
Requirements (FRs) as listed in Table 2. The seven 
FRs listed are the baseline for the system Security 
Assurance Levels (SALs). Within each of the seven 
FRs are applicable System Requirements (SRs). 
These are further broken down detailing the 
requirement of that SR, the rationale and 
supplemental guidance, the Requirement 
Enhancements (REs) and guidance for selection of 
REs relating to the SR dependent on the chosen SAL 
level for establishment of the achieved Security 
Assurance Level (SAL-A). 
Table 2: IEC 62443-3-3 Foundational Requirements. 
Foundational Requirement Code
1 Identification and Authentication Control IAC 
2 Use Control UC 
3 Data Integrity DI 
4 Data Confidentiality DC 
5 Restricted Data Flow RDF 
6 Timely Response to Events TRE 
7 Resource Availability RA 
3 SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Related Work 
ISO/IEC 15504-2 (ISO/IEC, 2003) provides a 
measurement framework for process capabilities and 
defines the requirements for performing the 
assessment, building the Process Reference Model 
(PRMs), Process Assessment Models (PAMs) and 
verifying conformity of process models and the 
process assessment. Existing generic Software 
Process Improvement (SPI) models are available 
which include the Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI®) (SEI, 2010) and ISO 15504-
5:2006 (ISO/IEC, 2006) (SPICE), but these models 
were not developed to provide sufficient coverage  
for regulatory compliance for the security of IT 
Networks incorporating medical devices. 
While this relates to the development of the PRM 
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 and the PAM for establishment of process assurance, 
it does not specifically address medical device 
product quality. One difference here is that, in 
addition to assessing the Medical Device 
Manufacturers software processes and practices, the 
key to this research is to also address product 
capabilities in relation to security of the 
interoperable medical devices. 
To address the requirement for a PAM for 
assessing the security of IT networks incorporating 
medical devices, we undertook extensive research in 
this area assisted by leading members from the 
international standards IEC SC62A JWG7 working 
group looking at a medical devices specific SPI 
model. This work is being developed in 
collaboration with the SPICE User Group. The 
approach taken here is in line with the approach 
taken for both the development of Automotive 
SPICE (Automotive SIG) a domain specific SPI 
model for the automotive industry, and Medi SPICE 
(Fergal McCaffery and Dorling, 2010). 
3.2 Proposal 
ISO/IEC 15026-4 (IEC, 2011a) is a process lifecycle 
standard and provides a solid foundation for the 
PRM.  It details processes for risk management 
which will be extended to include relevant security 
standards and requirements such as ISO/IEC 27002, 
ISO 27799 (ISO, 2008), IEC 62443, IEC 80001-2-2, 
NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-23 (NIST, 2009). 
All security controls and capabilities from these 
named sources will be crossed referenced and 
mapped to develop a comprehensive set of security 
capabilities which will need to be addressed when 
conducting a risk assessment and establishing 
relevant risk controls. For example, Automatic Log 
Off from IEC 80001-2-2 (Table 1) would use the 
requirements of SR.1.10 Session Lock in IEC 
62443-3-3 as they relate to each other.  All relevant 
controls/requirements from guidance docs and 
security standards included in the research will 
follow a similar mapping. 
The PRM will provide a description of the 
processes and characterise these in terms of their 
purpose and outcome.  This Process Assessment 
Model will be developed in compliance with 
ISO/IEC 15504-2 (ISO/IEC, 2003) which outlines 
what is required in the Process Assessment Model. 
This will be developed along with a measurement 
framework and ISO/TR 24774 (IEC, 2010) will 
provide the guidelines for process definition. 
These steps take care of the processes to be 
addressed for the development of a product. 
Establishing process assurance or maturity has many 
benefits for both the medical device manufacturers 
and third party assessors in terms of meeting 
regulatory compliance and also determination of 
process quality. However, considering the security 
risks associated with interoperable medical devices 
consisting of software, a major objective is to 
establish a method for the communication of the 
final product quality in relation to security 
capabilities between the Medical Device 
Manufacturer, the IT vendor and the Healthcare 
Delivery Organisation. Communication of a security 
assurance level to Healthcare Delivery Organisations 
will provide a simple and meaningful method for 
establishing suitability of the device for the users 
need and its environment.  To do this, IEC 62443-3-
3 will be used as a guide for establishing the system 
security assurance level (SAL) by the Medical 
Device Manufacturers. The Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation will determine the appropriate security 
capabilities from within IEC 80001-2-2, along with 
any other validated capabilities from other standards. 
With regards the different types of SAL, the critical 
property is the achieved SAL (SAL-A) since this is 
most valuable to the Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation and FDA when establishing the 
security capability of the product.  A SAL vector 
will be developed by the Medical Device 
Manufacturer post product development for the 
achieved SAL (SAL-A), which will be based on the 
target SAL (SAL-T) level (0-4) as determined by the 
Healthcare Delivery Organisation as the start of the 
acquisition process. The SAL vector that details the 
assurance level and security capabilities is presented 
here: 
SAL-A = ({FR,} domain) = {AC  UC  DI  DC  RDF  TRE  RA} 
SAL-A = ({FR,} domain) = {3  3  3  3  2  1  0} 
 
For each of the parameters (refer to table 2 for FR 
descriptions) within the vector, a value of zero to 
four will be used to represent the SAL level for that 
particular requirement.  Following on from this, the 
Medical Device Manufacturer will then verify the 
selected SAL level through the use of the SAL 
Mapping Matrix as shown in Annex B of IEC 
62443-3-3 (IEC, 2011a), which will  also be 
included in the PRM. 
To further build upon the communication and 
disclosure of security capabilities, an assurance case, 
compliant with IEC/ISO 15026-2 (IEEE, 2011) will 
be developed by the Medical Device Manufacturer. 
Delivering the actual product assurance level will be 
achieved through the utilisation of a tool. This tool 




 assessment and will in turn automatically build the 
assurance case and outline in detail the evidence 
gathered to support the achievement of each SAL 
level. 
The outcome of the PRM will be the 
development and communication of: 
1. A process maturity level for the development of 
the product; 
2. A security assurance case detailing in-depth the 
arguments and evidence supporting the 
security/safety claim of the medical device; 
3. An achieved security assurance level (SAL-A) 
for the product. 
4 SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT 
It is planned that this model will be trialled in 
industry for validation purposes.  This will be done 
at manufacturing facilities and Healthcare Delivery 
Organisations both in Ireland and the U.S. In 
addition to this, it is intended that the model will 
also be validated by experts from the International 
Standards Committee of IEC SC62A. 
At present, there is much concern in the area of 
medical devices particularly related to security 
vulnerabilities, threats and risks of devices with 
communication abilities or those incorporated onto 
IT networks.  Over the past 12 months, this concern 
has been highlighted through many federal body 
guidance publications and reports, security 
researchers’ demonstrations, publications and also 
the development of new standards such as IEC 
80001-1(IEC, 2011b). 
With the publication of the GAO (Government 
Accountability Office, 2012) report in August, it is 
clearly indicated here that future strategies are 
required in order to sufficiently address medical 
device security. As medical devices become more 
advanced with software and complex wireless 
capabilities, it is feared that security vulnerabilities, 
threats and related risks will grow with this 
development.  The GAO has recommended that the 
FDA work on addressing these issues following their 
assessment of FDA approved implantable 
defibrillators and insulin pumps. 
IEC 80001-2-2 defines the security capabilities 
that a Medical Device Manufacturer or IT vendor 
must communicate to the Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation in order to enhance knowledge of 
security risks and controls the Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation IT admin staff should consider. This 
research sets out to support this from both a process 
Figure 1: Research approach. 
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 and a product point of view. 
Developing a model to assess the Medical 
Device Manufacturer’s development process 
maturity coupled with guidance for the 
establishment of a security assurance level addresses 
development and output. The product output is the 
medical device achieved security assurance level 
(SAL-A) reflecting the security capabilities for that 
device and also the security controls incorporated. 
This output, in the form of a security assurance case, 
will be the communication from Medical Device 
Manufacturers to Healthcare Delivery Organisations 
prior to acquisition. Managing the lifecycle process 
and the product security capability between the 
Medical Device Manufacturer and the Healthcare 
Delivery Organisation would greatly improve the 
current processes in the industry at the moment. 
Currently there is no methodology to address both 
the development processes and the product 
capabilities for security in medical devices. This is 
the primary focus of this research. 
Hence, it is envisaged that the output of this 
research will positively impact the medical device 
domain by building awareness of security 
vulnerabilities, threats and related risks between the 
Healthcare Delivery Organisation and the Medical 
Device Manufacturer. 
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